



Director of  
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### **EL SALVADOR: Insurgents Increase Attacks**

*The insurgents are beginning to intensify their attacks, following nearly a month of regrouping and resupply activity.* [redacted]

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Press reports say there were increased insurgent attacks over the weekend in several parts of the country, including mortar attacks on San Salvador's suburbs and temporary interdiction of the main east-west highways.

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**ISRAEL-JORDAN: Initial Reactions to Hussein's Decision**

*Senior Israeli officials are saying that King Hussein's decision not to join the peace process means the end of the US proposal, but the US Embassy in Amman reports that most Jordanians are looking to Washington for new initiatives.*

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Official Israeli reaction has been generally low key. There has been no government statement on the Jordanian decision. Although Foreign Minister Shamir said yesterday that any effort by the US to revive the US plan would fail, no other senior cabinet official has commented publicly on Amman's decision.

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Privately, however, most Israelis are relieved that they will not have to face the hard choices that would have resulted from a decision by Jordan to join the peace process. Many share Shamir's belief that the US initiative is finished, and press accounts say that some senior officials are calling on the US to revive the Camp David negotiating framework.

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Most Jordanians blame the PLO for failing to support Hussein, according to the US Embassy. Some moderate Palestinians reportedly are criticizing PLO chief Arafat's leadership ability and questioning the organization's right to represent the Palestinians.

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**Comment:** The muted public reaction in Israel probably reflects Tel Aviv's desire not to aggravate strains in relations with the US. Israeli Government leaders almost certainly calculate that Hussein's decision will relieve US pressure on them to be more responsive to the peace process and hope that an improvement in relations can result.

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
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**JAPAN: Results of Local Elections**

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party did well in nationwide local elections on Sunday but lost to leftist opposition candidates in key gubernatorial races in the prefectures of Fukuoka and Hokkaido. The media are already playing the two losses as major setbacks for Prime Minister Nakasone. He campaigned for the defeated Liberal Democratic candidates and heavily emphasized arms control and other security issues. [redacted]

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**Comment:** It is not clear from the returns whether national issues played a role in the party's defeats. If party leaders believe such is the case, however, Nakasone may come under increasing pressure to lower his government's profile on security issues. In any event, he probably will wait for the results of the second round of local elections on 24 April before deciding whether to call early elections for the lower house of the Diet. [redacted]

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
### **USSR-EAST GERMANY: Romanov Heads Delegation**

Soviet Politburo member and Leningrad party leader Romanov arrived in Berlin on Sunday as head of the party delegation at an international commemoration of the centennial of Karl Marx's death and the 165th anniversary of his birth.

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**Comment:** Some knowledgeable Soviets had told Western diplomats that either General Secretary Andropov or his second in command, Konstantin Chernenko, would deliver a major address at this conference or at an earlier one in Moscow. Politburo candidate member Ponomarev, however, gave the speech in Moscow, and Romanov is likely to do the honors in Berlin. The failure of Andropov or Chernenko to speak on either occasion suggests that Ponomarev and Romanov were compromise choices by the Politburo.

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**ETHIOPIA: Campaign in Tigray Stalls**

Ethiopia's six-week-old offensive against rebels in Tigray Province is meeting stiff resistance. An Ethiopian brigade and a nearby division field headquarters recently suffered more than 500 casualties when they were overrun.

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**Comment:** The approximately 20,000 government troops in Tigray Province are thinly spread, and their supply lines—which run through difficult terrain—are vulnerable. The estimated 8,000 armed insurgents apparently have suffered only light casualties and can exploit the terrain and draw on local support. Addis Ababa's inability to contain the insurgency in Tigray—which threatens the overland supply route to Eritrea Province—could delay the government's plans for an offensive in Eritrea later this year.

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**MAURITIUS-US: Prime Minister Seeking Support**

Prime Minister Jugnauth, who has been shaken by the recent resignation of his pragmatic Finance Minister, is trying to strengthen his position by obtaining US economic support. He recently offered to welcome up to six US naval visits each year and has proposed selling fresh produce to the US fleet in the Indian Ocean. Jugnauth has asked the US to increase economic aid substantially or to persuade the IMF and the World Bank to soften their conditions for helping Mauritius.

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**Comment:** The left-leaning Jugnauth probably expects that he and his supporters will have to stand for reelection within the next few months because of his dispute with the Berenger faction. He has failed to obtain large-scale Soviet and Libyan economic aid and recognizes that Mauritius needs help from the IMF, the World Bank, and Western donors. He is aware, however, that the austerity measures required by the IMF and World Bank would hurt his chances in an election and is now counting on gaining US support. His currently more moderate approach will last only as long as he sees some hope of increased US aid.


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**USSR: Reorganization in Agriculture**

The Politburo continues to promote changes in agricultural management and has approved a merger of agriculture-related ministries in two non-Russian republics. A decree in Georgia last month abolished the republic's Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, and the State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture and established a State Committee for Agricultural Production. A similar reorganization was subsequently announced in Estonia.

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**Comment:** Georgian and Estonian officials had publicly lobbied for the establishment of a more powerful coordinating body at the republic level than was contemplated in the food program reorganization last May. The current decision is a step in that direction. Lack of cooperation between the now-merged organizations had been a severe problem at the district and farm level. The change, however, probably will complicate relations between the republics and Moscow, where there is as yet no organizational counterpart.

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **WESTERN EUROPE: Attitudes on INF**

*The latest US proposal on INF may soften West European public perceptions of US hawkishness on military issues, but majorities in the basing countries are likely to remain opposed to the missiles. Moreover, the size and composition of peace demonstrations over the Easter weekend indicate that protest activity may increase during the year. Although Allied governments welcomed the US proposal, their various attitudes on deployment have not changed. In the next few months they are likely to suggest additional ways to move negotiations forward.*

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Allied governments view the proposal as evidence of US sensitivity to their domestic political problems, but they do not believe this proposal alone can solve the problem of public anti-INF sentiment. Many West Europeans seem increasingly cynical and skeptical about the statements of the superpowers. As a result, little short of an actual agreement between the US and the USSR is likely to increase substantially the number who would accept deployment.

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The peace movement appears largely unaffected by the US offer, and the demonstrations at Easter probably matched in size those held last year. Increasing involvement by the West German Social Democrats and by organized labor is strengthening the protests.

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Social Democratic Party officials, who discouraged involvement in demonstrations when Helmut Schmidt was chancellor, called on party members to take part in the activity during Easter. The West German labor federation, after telling members not to participate in October 1981 and equivocating in June 1982, now implicitly approves participation by its members in demonstrations.

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The main Dutch labor federation, which did not support the massive November 1981 demonstration in Amsterdam, has agreed to support a major event in The Hague in October. Peace movement leaders in other basing countries also are trying to persuade unions to boycott INF-related construction, but they apparently have had little success.

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The participation of the Social Democrats and the labor groups may moderate the behavior of protesters and balance somewhat their

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demands, but it also will result in greater political pressure against INF. Those marching under party or union banners will prefer demonstrations in urban areas, while hardcore peace groups are likely to concentrate on increasingly stubborn passive resistance around military bases.

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The movement's leaders put more faith in unilateral disarmament and are much more negative than the general public about the arms control process. A completed interim INF agreement probably would reduce public opposition to deployment.

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An agreement also would cut into the strength of protests by reducing fears that the superpowers cannot deal reasonably with one another. This would place the onus of wrecking an East-West agreement on the peace movement should it continue to oppose deployment at any level.

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### **Government Positions**

For the governments in the deployment countries, public opinion and peace activity are only part of a complicated decisionmaking process that involves their relationships with the US and NATO, the East-West military balance, and political alignments in their respective countries. Political leaders generally hope Washington's proposal is a step toward an agreement rather than just a public relations gesture. They appear pleased that specific figures have been left until later, giving NATO greater flexibility and avoiding the risk of public debate on numbers.

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Government leaders in the basing countries understand the difficulties in arriving at new numbers and the mix between Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles. They want close consultations and an agreed NATO position before the US presents specific figures at Geneva.

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With public anti-INF sentiment in mind, these leaders also want to avoid any implication that the interim proposal was designed to make INF deployment inevitable. They will want to stress that the current proposal is a necessary step toward the ultimate goal of zero deployment.

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The Belgian and Dutch Governments, which have not yet agreed to INF deployment, are particularly concerned that the US might combine willingness to reduce INF totals with pressure on them for a quick decision to base the missiles. Belgian officials believe it will be difficult to explain to the public why any missiles are needed in their country and how reduced INF numbers were determined. They will continue to stress the zero option as a way to avoid missile deployments in Belgium.

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In the Netherlands, a spokesman for Prime Minister Lubbers' party recently voiced the hope that an interim agreement involving reduced INF numbers would make Dutch basing unnecessary. [redacted]

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**Hoping for a Compromise**

The Allies will be unlikely to urge the US to present specific new proposals at the next negotiating round in Geneva. They probably hope, however, that US negotiators will be able to explore a number of alternative INF levels with the Soviets without waiting for new offers from Moscow. [redacted]

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Although the Allies have publicly stated their disappointment with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's rejection of the US interim proposal, they almost certainly believe there is room for compromise.

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Some Allies also may seek ways implicitly to take French and British missiles into account. Dutch officials at NATO already have indicated The Hague's desire to include all nuclear weapons in some arms control forums. [redacted]

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